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body ' (126) that in today's increasingly charged and polarised political vocabulary in India would be seen as "anti-national", but without which the nation and its boundary-making power cannot be imagined or instituted in the first place. The story that narrates the relentless exploitation of bonded sexual labour in a still feudal but independent India reaches its climax in this scene which takes place during the annual ritual of independence day in which school children are taught to draw the map of the nation, as part of their geography and civics lesson in citizenship and patriotism. In this image, the nation is the strained container, as it were, of the spread-eagled body of the tribal woman sold into prostitution, and at the same time, her figure consumes the entirety of the space of the nation, leaving no room for the ceremony of patriotic love to go on as usual. Because with Douloti's diseased body spread on it, not only is there no room for the flagpole on which the national flag is to be hoisted, there is the transmogrification of the pure, illuminated beauty of the iconic Mother India who serves as the emblematic figure of the Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation), into that of a diseased prostitute. This last image from Devi's story is an excessive, over-determined, even melodramatic image that encapsulates the current political moment in India in which the definition of who belongs to the nation, who loves it and celebrates it, is becoming narrower than ever. If the right-wing Hindu supremacist forces read this story, if they are capable of reading this story, Mahasweta Devi would be declared an anti-national writer for having dared to imagine this scene of the nation's body sullied by the putrefied and exploited body of a tribal woman. 3 Because what throws Devi's love for the nation in doubt is that she reveals such a love in the service of nationalism to be a profoundly gendered and violent formation. As a writer who moulds the story's climax as one in which Douloti dies on the map of India on a day marked out for its celebration, Devi reveals the gendered fragility of the very idea of love for the nation, inseparable as it is from the force of sexual violence.
Sexual violence as the means to impose a masculinist, dominant caste, communal and nationalist version of the nation in contemporary India has manifold forms and possesses historical continuity even as we witness an intensification of it now. As we saw in the stark image discussed above, of the tribal woman who has been relentlessly sexually exchanged, sexual violence accompanies both the very act of making a map of the nation, but also that of instituting the national economy that even in a globalising India thrives on the bonded and sexualised labour of its poorest, most marginalised citizens. Thus, sexual violence also shapes a range of identities related to the ideology of nationalism, such as religion, caste and class, that determine questions of belonging and rights in the nation and to the land, just as sexual violence, or the ever-present threat of it, places women in subservient positions within sexual as well as non-sexual relationships.
Further, the forms of identity markers such as caste, religion, region and class, while typically expressed in terms that transcend history and social change, are in fact subject to intense shifting pressures, often very violent in their accumulative drive, from the forces of neo-liberal capitalism as well as attendant transformations in the political economy of the country today.
These are typically manifested as urbanization, industrialisation and modernization, among other processes, that play a structuring role in the ways in which women's subservient position is maintained and reproduced in ways that are violently embodied.
In this analysis, I embrace a broad but distinct definition of sexual violence.
Mainstream definitions of sexual violence focus on bodily harm and encompass sexual harassment, sexual assault and rape on a spectrum of degrees of violence and cast women as victims in a misogynist and patriarchal society. Nivedita Menon (2012) points to the disproportionate focus on rape when it comes to sexual violence as well as to the important difference in the ways in which 'patriarchal forces' see rape as 'evil because it is a crime against the honour of the family', a fate worse than death, and feminists who see rape as 'a crime against the autonomy and bodily integrity of a woman' (113). She goes on to further query the ways in which the 'impact and maybe even the sexual violence itself, flow from the discourse which constructs 'sex', 'sexual violence' and 'sexuality' as the deepest aspects of one's "real" and "private' self" such that sexual violence is construed as a 'violation of the sense of wholeness…one's belief in one's unique selfhood' (141).
I seek to extend this analysis in order to think about sexual violence, precisely because it is imbricated in notions of wholeness (Menon refers to this as a 'mystification of sexuality'), as an integral part of the ideological project of nationalist, patriarchal, dominant caste and capitalist subjugation of women and sexual minorities. It is only with the force of sexual violence that these projects are maintained and continually reproduced. On this reading, sexual violence is not limited to a spectacular physical act but is wound up in discourses and institutions of power. This would enable us to question the hegemonic understanding of sexual violence as the worst kind of violence and instead locate it within an understanding of the processes by which gender difference (couched as threat) is used to further specific political and ideological agendas.
Following from this, there are three aspects in particular that I want to consider in this essay-a) sexual violence as part of the state project of controlling and disciplining rebellious populations and territories and as a weapon of war; b) as a means of political and social assertion, as a mode of maintaining caste, communal and class power, and as part of the dominant national imaginary of the place of women in society through regulating public and private divisions; and c) as a means of structuring family power, intimacy and sexuality and the patriarchal order that determines the remit of each, including controlling women's bodies and reproductive choices. It is of course well known that in times of war, rape has been used as a potent and highly sexualized weapon of war to demoralize opponents by assaulting women's honour. 5 But armies of nation states have also turned sexual violence as a weapon not just against an enemy beyond the borders, but as a weapon against their own citizens who are seen as dissenters or traitors. In India, too, the state has used sexual violence to discipline, contain and shame those that it sees as anti-national or not national enough. Uma Chakravarti (1982) discusses custodial rape as a specific form of sexual violence on the part of the various agencies of the state whose perpetrators include 'forest officials, army personnel, and especially…policemen'. The gang-rape of over fifty women in the villages of Kunan-Poshpora in Kashmir is widely considered to be the largest case of state-led mass sexual violence in independent India.
On February 23, 1991, about 2011 and tortured and sexually assaulted in custody, providing one of the most egregious instances of recent times where a police state used brutal means to subdue a tribal woman seen as a threat to the "law and order" of society and nation. Another example is that of Bhanwari Devi, the dalit (oppressed class) health worker who was gang-raped by upper caste men in 1992 as punishment for trying to implement the government's law against child marriage in her village (see Geeta Pandey, 2017 ). These instances demonstrate a manifold dimension to the ways in which the state directly exercises sexual violence-to police its borders, to discipline internal threat to its hegemony, to support and enhance the hegemonic power of dominant caste men and men of the religious majority, as well as, as Chakravarti (1982) and Kavita Krishnan (2013) have argued, to control those women who are at the forefront of movements against exploitative landlords and corporate land grab, such that rape has become a weapon against people resisting primitive accumulation (see also Madhok and Rai, 2012 , for the violence entailed in neoliberal "agency-indevelopment" for women like Bhanwari Devi). The gruesome murders and the gang-rapes of two dalit women in Khairlanji, a village less than a thousand kilometres from Mumbai, by upper caste men on September 29, 2006, seem to have been precipitated by a land dispute. The murdered and raped Bhotmanges were a land-owning dalit family who were resisting giving up their land for road construction. Several reports implicate local BJP politicians in the murders and the rapes (Buckwalter, 2006) . Writing in the early 1980s, Chakravarti (1982) conscience" was mobilised to procure justice for Jyoti Singh, the young woman whose gang-rape in New Delhi on December 16, 2012 led to massive protests and demonstrations in every part of the country, there is a deafening national silence on rapes committed in the peripheries of the nation state and on political minorities and cultural dissidents (see Daniyal, 2017) .
UnCivil Society
As political theorists have argued, there is a significant tension in defining civil society as either the bourgeois social space of law-abiding citizens who come together as equals, standing above community in a public sphere free of coercion, or a more communitarian sense in which civil society represents a shared identity among its members and performs a mediating function between the state and the private spheres. Such a communitarian view brings into the remit of civil society religious institutions and caste associations.
Without going into a comprehensive overview of this literature, for the purposes of this essay I will take civil society to mean the contested and shifting space between the state and family, between public and private, between law and tradition, between community and the self. This contested, messy arena is where we witness an intensifying generalized sexual violence in contemporary Indian society-whether it is sexual harassment in the workplace, including violence against domestic workers or against social workers like Bhanwari Devi, the physical insecurity faced by call-centre and mall workers and other women workers making their way to and from work, and a general sexualisation of office and other spaces of work.
Although some may consider them pre-capitalist remnants within a modernizing society, Khap panchayats are an interesting phenomenon that defies established understandings of civil society (see Baxi, Rai and Sardar Ali, 2007) . These are caste and clan-based village associations that carry out functions of maintaining the social order and gendered propriety among its members, and seem to have gained significant traction since the Hindu right has come to power in the centre in spite of widespread negative publicity. In Basauli khap panchayat near Agra in Uttar Pradesh, as modern technology is seen to have a corrupting influence on girls. 8 In its implicit support of these khaps, for both electoral and ideological reasons, the Hindu right once again betrays its commitment to caste and religious affiliations over secular legal frameworks that guarantee equality to both men and women. Thus, the current Prime Minister Narendra Modi's campaign towards realizing the goal of a "digital India" is shot through with gender discrimination and sexual oppression in which women's access to digital gadgets and virtual space is constantly policed and subjected to community control.
But while khap panchayats have an older history of patriarchal and coercive regulation of community, one could argue that a khap mentality seems to have become widely pervasive wherein community-supported male leaders take the law into their own hands in the name of maintaining social order, for keeping women safe, and safeguarding public morality. There have also been reports in the rise of what have come to be called "honour killings" where family members are directly implicated in the torture and murder of young people daring to fall in love and marry someone of another caste. 9 A widespread sense of vigilantism is now socially endorsed as youth participate in self-policing and disciplining young people, especially women, whose private affairs may be crossing the lines of caste, class and religion. These Indian food like 'paratha' and 'halwa'. 12 On a less frivolous note, Mohan Bhagwat, the RSS chief, announced that rapes occurred in India, not Bharat (the Hinduised name for India), implying that Bharat and India, one rural, traditional, conservative, respectful of women and authentic, the other urban, Westernised and inauthentic, were in fact two different nations and that rape was an urban phenomenon. 13 Bhagwat's comments belied the countless instances of rapes of dalit and tribal women in India's villages, and reinforced retrograde tradition as the saviour of women. When conservative elements, especially in the Hindu right, do acknowledge the problem of rape, the blame for the violation is often placed on the woman herself. Thus, Ram Jethmalani, the lawyer for Asaram Bapu, a godman (and one-time associate of the Indian Prime Minister Modi) who has been charged with the rape of a minor girl, argued that the girl Bapu is accused of having assaulted suffered from a 'chronic disease' that leads a woman to be attracted to men. 14 Sexual violence is indeed seen as related to increasing social divides between urban and rural spaces, but also across class divides, from a range of different political perspectives. In the aftermath of the 2012 Delhi gang-rape that garnered international coverage, the left-wing feminist activist Kavita Krishnan drew sharp and accurate attention to the ways in which the media was sensationalizing the case since the perpetrators were migrants from rural and backward states such as Bihar and UP, and that sections of the ruling class, police, and the corporate media had made a deliberate attempt to profile the poor and migrant labour as the fountainhead of crime. For in reality, of course, sexual violence was hardly the monopoly of poor, alienated urban migrants.
In a different but related vein, neo-liberal capitalism is often presented as the root cause for increasing sexual violence. In a Channel 4 interview soon after the December 2012 rape, the writer Arundhati Roy spoke about 'the widening gap between the rich and the poor' and went on to suggest the hyper 'conspicuous consumption' of India's globalizing elites that is producing 'an anger and a psychosis' for which 'women at the top, at the middle and the bottom are going to pay the price', particularly young urban women and dalit women (Banerjee, 2013) . Taking Roy's words as an instance, Sreenanti approach that shares concerns in a rather startling manner with right-wing ideologues. As Banerjee writes, it is important for 'the intellectual Left' to be 'more critical and tentative about its critique of conspicuous consumption and the homogenization of its effects', so as 'to keep its theoretical distance from an atavistic nativist criticism of consumer culture of the Hindu Right or even the nationalist political project for that matter.'
In the December 2012 gang-rape case to which Roy is responding, the victim of the rape was named "nirbhaya" or the fearless one, and was quickly appropriated as an icon of the heroic woman of a modern and globalizing India. Although her class and social background was working class, she was studying to become a professional and was raped on an evening when she was on an outing to watch a film at a mall with a male friend. For the middle classes leading the protests in Delhi, she was a respectable woman enjoying the freedoms associated with globalisation, and she deserved protection. Thus, even as the protests used the language of feminist emancipation, they remained within the ambit of a conservative social ideology that sees rape as the ultimate degradation of a woman. This was expressed well by Sushma Swaraj, then a BJP Member of Parliament and who is currently India's Minister of External Affairs, for whom a raped woman was a 'zinda laash', a live corpse, suggesting that to be raped is to have a fate worse than death. The massive public protests after the rape did lead to calls for gender sensitization, especially among the police force, as well as the inclusion of gender studies in educational curricula, repeal of rape laws and increased security for women in public places, but the space where the rape was being protested was itself not free from violence, as calls for death penalty, castration and brutal physical revenge that would match the barbarism of the rape itself became loud and clear. So that even as words like patriarchy and misogyny entered public debate-on television sets, living rooms and in Parliament--the language of violence saturated and framed the discussion. Thus even as the Justice Verma Commission's recommendations that were produced in the aftermath of the December rape case marked a step forward in legislating There is a constitutive contradiction in this Hindutva version of there being a universal public sphere of co-religionists as the intimate sphere of sexuality, selfhood and family relationships is nonetheless subsumed within the larger interests of the kutumb or the family as the central unit of the Hindu nation, which is the universal sphere for the Hindu right. In the Hindutva version of nationalism, women have to love the nation not as equal, consensual partners but as sacrificing and subservient citizens. The Hindu right has no doubt also promoted in recent years a number of women foot-soldiers known as sadhvis (nuns), the best known being Sadhvi Ritambhara and Sadhvi Pragya, who epitomise the notion of the powerful and aggressive Hindu woman who calls upon Hindu men to not shy away from the use of violence to subjugate the Muslim "other". But a sadhvi has nevertheless sacrificed (through renunciation) her sexuality and familial bearings in the service of the Hindu nation (Bacchetta, 1996) . Paola Bacchetta (1996) writes of how the Rashtriya Sevika Samiti, the women's wing of the RSS, constructs its history in opposition to Indian left and liberal women's movements gaining ground in the 1930s. She cites an undated (but post-1978) publication in English in which a preoccupation with women's struggles for 'equal rights and economic freedom' is seen as producing women who would be 'non-committed to love, sacrifice, service', thereby contributing to the 'disintegration of family (sic), the primary and most important unit of imparting good samskaras' (values) (130-131). On such a view, the fate of women, family and nation is interlinked, such that any violation of the nation's sacred geography by an outsider is a violation of the nation's women themselves.
We see evidence of the saturation of this view in the ubiquitous terms and phrases used for women who may be strangers-respecting a woman means giving her a familial title of mother, aunt or sister. It is this deeply conservative notion of the centrality of the family in society that leads to instances where rapists are often pressured to marry their victims, in the hopes of erasing the trauma and taboo of rape. Or, when rapes of sex-workers are not deemed to be rapes and marital rape fails to get recognition as rape. 15 The same khaps that advocate avenging the loss of honour of Hindu, upper-caste women even when they participate in consensual relationships with dalit or Muslim men, opportunistically engage in public relations campaigns such as "beti bachao" launched by Narendra Modi. For it is the honour of daughters that needs to be salvaged from Muslims, a view widely advocated during and after the Muzzafarnagar riots by BJP politicians, including by Amit Shah, the president of the BJP. As Krishnan (2014) puts it, 'invariably, profiling men of the `'other' community as a danger to the daughter and to one's honour, goes hand-inhand with coercion and violence against women of one's own community.' At the same time, any violation of Muslim women is justified vengeance for restoring the honour of the Hindu community. As such, sexual violence is one of the key modes by which communal violence is carried out in India (see Kannabiran, 1996) .
Along these lines, a recent judgment has declared that single individuals living together will now be considered as married couples, as there is no space in Hindutva's understanding of sexual relations outside of marriage. It is therefore no surprise that the Hindu right remains committed to a homophobic position and has over the years mobilized public support to oppose the abrogation of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code which designates same-sex relations as 'unnatural' and homosexuality as a 'genetic disorder'. 16
Unmodifying India
Working towards a conclusion I want to suggest that sexual violence as a longpractised strategy of the Indian state to control dissident territories and subjects, and as structuring both civil and private sexual relationships, has Of course it can be rightly argued that sexual violence as a determining feature of a hierarchical society such as India, where caste, class, religion and other differences mix with toxic colonial legacies of sexualised social divisions, precedes the coming to power of Modi. 17 After all, the postcolonial Indian state has used sexual violence since its inception to keep in check resurgent rebellions within its formal territory, and that it has long provided the means of the production of violence to dominant sections of society. However, one can begin by looking at Modi's own highly masculinist public discourse emphasizing his manliness (a common trope of his election campaign leading up to his victory in 2014 was his "56-inch chest"!), but also in the unleashing of a masculinised public vocabulary that seeks to talk over feminist and other 
Coda
What the essay has argued throughout is that there has been a generalisation of sexual violence in postcolonial India, and that increasingly, as the Hindu right consolidates its political power, it is no longer an aberration. I want to close the essay by turning to another short story by Devi called "Draupadi" (Spivak, 1981) that brings together the various strands of argument explored in this essay. "Draupadi" genders the issue of resistance against the widespread experience of state repression by India's exploited tribal populations. Dopdi (the indigenized name of the central character, Draupadi being the Sansksritic name) and her husband are Naxalite militants on the run. 22 Dopdi's husband has died in the forest, and the paramilitary forces deployed to suffocate the insurgency, are lying in wait for Dopdi who they expect will come to claim her husband's body and that they will be able to capture her then. In time, they succeed in their mission, and her capture is accompanied by a gang rape by the forces and state officials. kingdom. When that is lost, they are spurred on by their rivals to stake their wife Draupadi in the game. When they lose her as well, the Kauravas begin to disrobe her in order to wreak total vengeance on their opponents. But since she is a devotee of the god Krishna to whom she prays fervently in the moment of her public shaming, she is saved. The more the Kauravas pull her sari, the longer it grows, and the disrobing is a failure. Draupadi's honour remains intact, even as her husbands and their evil cousins are exposed and demeaned in their act of staking Draupadi's honour for material and political gain.
In Devi's story, the classical Draupadi is transformed into the tribal Dopdi whose abjected body (raped, tortured) transforms into a resistant force. Her body speaks through its wounds, its cuts, bruises, and the blood-soaked pubic hair. When the head of the paramilitary force arrives to witness the fruit of his capture, he asks for Dopdi to be brought out of her hut, an act he thinks will finally tame and shame this dangerous rebel. In the climactic scene in the story, Dopdi emerges from the hut where she has been raped all night and stands stark naked in the daylight. The soldiers expect that her nakedness will shame her. As a gesture of consideration, the chief asks her to cover herself, but Dopdi refuses. She stands there, her body brutalized all over, her pubic hair matted with blood, refusing to cover herself and looks straight into his eye. The Senanayak (the officer) has no option but to avert his gaze, for it is the masculinised state that is exposed in that moment for its deployment of sexual violence as a means of control-it is he who is shamed.
There are of course many reasons why this story is so powerful, but chief among them is for the ways in which it mobilises myth to tell a story of contemporary rape and the brutalization of tribal and dalit women in India today. The story resonates so powerfully because sexual violence in India has become both very spectacular in its mediatization, and totally routine, as daily newspaper pages would testify, even as rapes of tribal women such as Dopdi go largely unreported. 23 
Freedom without Fear
Given the perceived ubiquity of sexual violence as a threat and its actual use as a weapon of control by the state and by reactionary religious formations, it is no surprise that several women's movements that have emerged recently in India have focused on combatting sexual violence through reclaiming public and private spaces. The crucial re-articulation effected by these movements, as opposed to earlier moments, consists of a definite move away from what was previously framed as a call for safe spaces for women, safe from violence and violation. Now the demand is expressed as the need for spaces without fear, spaces free from fear, as in the slogan "bekhauf azadi", a fearless freedom, a call made by the progressive women's movement in the aftermath of the December 16 th , 2012 rape. This is no longer a call merely for separate and safe spaces for women in trains and buses, or in cities and towns for better street lighting and cctv cameras, but a call for a space of freedom from the very gendered ideology of safety. Similarly, the movement "pinjra tod" ("break the cage") of women in university hostels who are subject to strict regulations of mobility through curfews and other modes of control is not just an evocation of the earlier slogan of breaking the prison chains, but of emerging from the pinjra/cage without fear and without feelings of insecurity and threat. Other campaigns along these lines that have spread to many big and small cities in India in the last few years have been the Slutwalk movement (held in various Indian cities in 2011), the Pink Chaddi campaign (the Pink Panty campaign, against the attack on women in pubs and spaces considered "immoral" and thus out of bounds for "decent" women) and the Why Loiter movement. Inspired by the work of Shilpa Phadke, Shilpa Ranade and Samira Khan (2011) , the Why Loiter movement boldly seeks to unsettle the notion that women in public spaces need to move about with an aim in mind. Instead, the Why Loiter movement is a call to reclaim the city for pleasure, not safety. 24 There is here a clear move from safety to rights, and although class issues are sometimes elided in it, it remains to be seen whether movements such as these can have a wider impact against the pervasiveness of sexual violence in the context of the growing power of the Hindu right and other forms of religious fundamentalism. All of these forces fear and loathe a woman out on her own or with other women, resisting the state, resisting family and society and most of all, asserting freedom without fear in spaces deemed to be out of bounds for her. 
